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Abstract 
 
In the process of regulatory reform in the electric power industry, the mitigation of market power is one 
of the basic problems regulators have to deal with. We use experimental data to study the sources of 
market power with supply function competition, akin to the competition in wholesale electricity 
markets. An acute form of market power may arise if a supplier is pivotal; that is, if the supplier’s 
capacity is required in order to meet demand. To be able to isolate the impact of demand and capacity 
conditions on market power, our treatments vary the distribution of demand levels as well as the 
amount and symmetry of the allocation of production capacity between different suppliers. We relate 
our results to a descriptive power index and to the predictions of two alternative models: a supply 
function equilibrium (SFE) model and a multi-unit auction (MUA) model. We find that pivotal 
suppliers do indeed exercise their market power in the experiments. We also find that observed 
behavior is consistent with the range of equilibria of the unrestricted SFE model and inconsistent with 
the unique equilibria of two refinements of the SFE model and of the MUA model. 
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1. Introduction 
 In the worldwide process of regulatory reform in the electricity industry, the possible 
existence of market power is one of the basic problems analysts and policy makers have to 
deal with. Field data document the existence of reduced competition due to market power in 
some electric power markets (Wolfram 1999; Borenstein et al. 2002). The severe welfare 
losses this may cause are a major concern that needs to be addressed to fully assess the 
success of the reforms. If non-competitive prices can easily persist in these markets, this 
creates the need to find measures to mitigate market power. 
 Among the features of markets that need to be taken into account in relation to market 
power is the presence of one or more pivotal suppliers. In a general sense, a producer can be 
considered to be pivotal if, without his capacity, the supply cannot serve the whole demand. 
The issue is not one of insufficient total capacity to serve the market demand, but one of 
particular producers controlling large enough parts of the capacity. We will refer to market 
power due to pivotal suppliers as pivotal power.  
 Concerns about pivotal power are the basis for some energy policy provisions. For 
instance, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) may block a generation 
company from charging market-based rates for energy if the company fails either of two 
screening tests for market power. One of the tests used by FERC is the pivotal supplier 
screen; a generation supplier is deemed pivotal, and therefore fails the test, if peak demand 
cannot be met in the relevant market without production from the supplier’s capacity.1  
 In this paper we present results from laboratory experiments in which we study the effects 
of pivotal power. To our knowledge this is the first experimental study focusing on this 
specific issue. A potentially important distinction for policy-makers is the presence of a 
pivotal supplier vs. the supplier’s incentive to exercise market power. We examine in the 
laboratory the extent to which pivotal suppliers actually exercise market power under varying 
market conditions. We study both the cases where pivotal power is evenly spread among 
producers and where it is concentrated in a subset of producers. The first case corresponds 
more to a situation of tight market capacity and the second more to a case in which particular 
firms may have strong influence on market outcomes, even though market capacity is large. 
                                                          
1  The following quote is from FERC Order No. 697 (2007), pp. 18-19:  “The second screen is the pivotal supplier screen, 
which evaluates the potential of a seller to exercise market power based on uncommitted capacity at the time of the 
balancing authority area’s annual peak demand. This screen focuses on the seller’s ability to exercise market power 
unilaterally. It examines whether the market demand can be met absent the seller during peak times. A seller is pivotal if 
demand cannot be met without some contribution of supply by the seller or its affiliates.” 
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To study more closely the circumstances under which pivotal power may matter, we also 
analyze the impact on market power of a variation in the extent of demand uncertainty.  
 The use of laboratory experiments makes it possible to implement the desired variations 
in capacity distributions with a high degree of control, in order to study their effects under 
conditions that are strongly ceteris paribus. This control makes the experimental method a 
useful tool for studying electric power markets (Rassenti et al. 2002; Staropoli and Jullien 
2006). In addition the possibility of replication allows for a very systematic study of the 
relevant issues. (See Falk and Heckman 2009 for a recent methodological discussion of 
laboratory experiments).  
 Though pivotal power as such has not been studied experimentally, previous laboratory 
experiments do show that market power is easily exerted in environments that mirror the 
wholesale electricity market. Moreover, experiments have been useful for studying how 
certain market features can increase or limit market power; demand side bidding (Rassenti, 
Smith and Wilson 2003) and forward trading (Brandts, Pezanis-Christou and Schram 2008) 
have been shown to enhance competition.  
Outside of the laboratory the notion of pivotal power has been investigated before, both 
with descriptive measures of suppliers’ positions in the market and with theoretical models. 
The Residual Supply Index (hereafter, RSI) provides a measure of the degree of pivotal power 
based on fundamental economic intuition. The RSI measures the aggregate capacity of all 
suppliers except the largest as a fraction of total demand. The largest supplier is pivotal when 
this index is less than one and the lower the RSI the higher pivotal power. Field data suggest 
that the RSI is a useful indicator. The higher the index’ value −i.e., the lower the weight of 
the largest supplier−, the lower were price-cost margins in the summer peak hours of the year 
2000 in the California wholesale market (Rahimi and Sheffrin 2003). Wolak (2009) develops 
a measure of a supplier’s ability to exercise unilateral market power in each half-hour period 
in his study of the New Zealand wholesale electricity market. He notes that this ability to 
exercise market power is strengthened the greater the probability that the supplier is pivotal 
during the period.2 Wolak finds a positive correlation between the average half-hourly firm-
level ability to exercise unilateral market power and half-hourly market prices. 
More formal analyses of pivotal power have been based on either a multi-unit auction 
model (Anwar 1999; Fabra et al. 2006), hereafter MUA, or the supply function equilibrium 
                                                          
2  Wolak discusses pivotal suppliers and their significance in the New Zealand wholesale market in Section 3.4 of part 2 of 
his report. He defines a pivotal supplier as follows: “A supplier that faces a residual demand curve that is positive for all 
possible positive prices is said to be a pivotal because some of its supply is necessary to serve the market demand regardless 
of the offer price.” [Wolak (2009), p. 115] 
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model (Klemperer and Meyer 1989), hereafter SFE. Both are models of one-shot strategic 
interaction. The MUA is a discrete unit model in which each supplier submits price offers for 
units of capacity under their control. Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord (2006) utilize the 
MUA to compare uniform and discriminatory auction formats under distinct environments 
concerning costs, capacity, and demand characteristics. Our focus in the present paper is on 
uniform price auctions. For uniform price auctions, the MUA predicts Bertrand-like 
outcomes with price equal to marginal cost for cases with no pivotal firms. If pivotal firms 
are present then the MUA predicts equilibrium prices above marginal cost, with the extent of 
price-cost markups and the character of equilibrium prices depending on the nature of 
demand uncertainty and the allocation of capacity across firms. 
 The SFE assumes a completely divisible good and has been used to study a variety of 
issues related to electric power markets (Green 1999; Newbery 1998; Baldick et al. 2004; 
Bolle 2001). In the standard model each seller submits a supply function that specifies the 
quantities supplied at different prices (Klemperer and Meyer 1989). At the time the sellers 
submit their supply functions, demand is typically uncertain. The supply functions are 
aggregated and intersected with realized demand to obtain a uniform market price. If the 
range of demand variation is bounded then there is a continuum of equilibria. The 
equilibrium price at the upper bound of demand realizations ranges between the competitive 
price and the Cournot price. The assumption of divisible output and the use of supply 
function strategies essentially expand the set of equilibria relative to that of the MUA. If there 
are no pivotal suppliers then the MUA equilibrium involves marginal cost pricing; the SFE 
model has that equilibrium as well as additional equilibria with positive price-cost markups. 
If pivotal suppliers are present then the SFE model may yield equilibria with prices below 
those of a MUA equilibrium (Genc and Reynolds 2010).  
 Neither model of pivotal power has to date been applied to either field or laboratory data. 
In our data analysis we will use the input of both the descriptive index and the two theoretical 
models. As will be seen, the RSI proposes certain shifts in prices in response to changes in 
total capacity and its distribution, but is silent about what price levels should be expected. 
The two theoretical models allow us to go beyond that. The MUA prescribes unique pure 
strategy equilibrium prices for four of the five environments we consider and mixed strategy 
equilibria for the fifth. The SFE yields pure strategy equilibrium price sets for each parameter 
constellation that we study. Aside from these sets, we will also consider two refinements of 
the SFE. In each case for which the MUA has a pure strategy equilibrium, this equilibrium is 
also an equilibrium for the SFE.  
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Our results show that observed market prices change with capacity levels and their 
distribution. The existence of overall excess capacity is not enough to guarantee competitive 
prices. The way in which they change is intuitive and consistent with the qualitative 
predictions of the RSI. In contrast to these effects of capacities, the variations in the demand 
range have smaller effects on observed market prices.  
We also study the best response behavior of our subjects. We compare actual profits to 
optimal profits for subjects and compare these results to those from a similar analysis with 
field data from the Texas (ERCOT) wholesale power balancing market (Hortacsu and Puller 
2008). We find that the behavior we observe in our experiments is closer to best responding 
than behavior in the particular field environment we compare our data to. 
Overall, we find that observed behavior is consistent with the range of equilibria of the 
unrestricted SFE model and inconsistent with the unique equilibria of the MUA model and 
two refinements of the SFE model. In treatments without pivotal power, observed prices are 
on average higher than the marginal cost level of the MUA equilibrium, though there is a 
tendency for them to move towards the competitive MUA prediction. For treatments with 
market power observed prices are consistent with the qualitative feature of the SFE that 
market power caused by a symmetric reduction in capacity has a stronger effect on prices 
than market power caused by an asymmetric distribution of overall high capacity.  
Our experiments bear some similarity to multi-unit auction experiments reported on in 
Sefton and Zhang (2010); these are sales auctions with three buyer subjects, in contrast to our 
procurement auctions with four seller subjects. The discrete units Nash equilibrium prediction 
in Sefton and Zhang is for each buyer to bid their value (roughly corresponding to subjects 
offering units at marginal cost in our experiments). Nash equilibria for a divisible units 
model, applied to Sefton and Zhang’s experiments, include bid-shading behavior with bids 
below values.3 Experimental results in Sefton and Zhang are consistent with bids equal to 
values; they find little evidence of bid shading. This is in contrast with results in our high-
capacity treatments, in which average offers remained well above marginal cost for some 
groups. We discuss possible reasons for the differences in experimental results below. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we present 
our experimental design and procedures. Specific theoretical predictions are provided in 
section 3. The results follow in section 4. Section 5 concludes and discusses the implications 
of our findings.  
                                                          
3  Sefton and Zhang’s parameterized experimental model with discrete units has multiple equilibria, including equilibria 
involving bid shading.  
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2.  Design and Procedures 
 In the experiment there are 25 rounds each consisting of five periods. The demand is 
simulated using a simple box-design (Davis and Holt, 1993). In each of the five periods t in 
round r, a perfectly inelastic demand rtd is randomly chosen from the set 
r
td ∈{dmin,…, dmax} 
with equal probabilities for each element in the set. In all of our treatments, dmax=35. We 
define l≡dmin/dmax as the load ratio, which is our first treatment variable. All sessions have 
either l=4/7 (i.e., dmin=20) or l=6/7 (dmin=30).4 There is a price cap given by pmax=25, i.e. no 
units can be traded above this price.  
On the supply side there are four firms in each market. Each subject represents one firm. 
Each firm j offers a discrete number of units in round r, which will apply to each period t in r. 
Any units sold are produced at constant marginal costs c=5.5 Individual supply is limited by 
an exogenously enforced maximum capacity maxjs . These determine industry capacity, which 
is given by ∑
=
≡
4
1
maxmax .
j
jsS   
Our second treatment variable is this industry capacity. This is given by either Smax=48 or 
Smax=36. Note that in both cases dmax<Smax, i.e., in all cases industry capacity suffices to 
satisfy the maximum demand. Our third treatment variable pertains to the Smax=48 case. We 
distinguish between the case where this capacity is distributed evenly across firms 
( 4,..,1,12max == js j ) and the case where there is asymmetric capacity 
( 215 ,j,s maxj == , 4319 ,j,smaxj == ). For the Smax=36 treatment we only consider the 
symmetric case ( 4,..,1,9max == js j ).  
Firm j offers units for sale in round r by bidding a discrete ‘supply function’, rjs . This is 
a vector of up to maxjs supply prices, 
sr
jkp , ordered from low to high at which firm j is willing 
to sell units: rjs =(
sr
js
sr
j
sr
j
j
ppp max,...,, 21 ), with .2,1 ≥≥ − kpp srjksrjk 6 Subjects can offer fewer than 
max
js  units by not entering prices for them. Equivalently, they can offer m < 
max
js units by 
setting .,...,1,26 maxj
sr
jk smkp +== 7 The individual supply functions are combined and supply 
prices are ordered from low to high to obtain the market supply function for round r, denoted 
                                                          
4 The load ratio affects the theoretically predicted outcomes (cf. section 3). 
5 Given our focus on pivotal power, the assumption of constant marginal costs is not restrictive.  
6 The “s” superscript on the price variable indicates that the variable is a price offer made by a seller. 
7 Units offered at a price above the price cap, pmax=25 will not be sold. 
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by sr=( )(),....,1( maxSss rr ), which is a vector of the Smax submitted supply prices ordered from 
low to high (if necessary, supplemented with infinite prices for units not supplied). Finally, a 
uniform transaction price, rtp , is determined in each period t of r by comparing 
r
td  to s
r: 
maxmin{ ( ), }.r r rt tp s d p≡  Note that if max)( pds rtr > , then supply cannot satisfy demand at a 
price below pmax, and k < rtd units are sold, where k is uniquely determined by s
r(k)<25 and 
sr(k+1)>25. 
 Finally, the payoffs of firm j in round r, rjπ , are determined by the uniform prices in each 
of the five periods of a round and the marginal costs: 
 ( )5
1
1 4
=
π = − =∑r r rj t tj
t
p c q , j ,...,  
where  rtjq  denotes the number of units sold by j in period t of round r. 
In the experiment, subjects submit supply functions by entering a price for each possible 
unit in a table. To ease the task, the software fills gaps between units priced. For example, if a 
subject enters a price of 5 for unit 1 and then 7 for unit 5, then units 2-4 are automatically 
priced at 7, though the subject can subsequently change them. In addition, the software does 
not allow decreasing prices across units. The subject is free to withhold units from the market 
by leaving them unpriced, as long as all subsequent units remain unpriced as well. No supply 
price is submitted until the subject finalizes and confirms the complete set. There is no time 
limit for submission of the supply functions.  
After all four subjects have submitted a supply function, they are aggregated and the 
result is confronted with 5 subsequent demand realizations – the 5 periods of a round − 
yielding 5 prices. Each realization appears on the subjects’ monitors for 5 seconds. After the 
5 periods, the subject can page back and forth between the periods until satisfied. After 
everyone has indicated that they are ready the next round commences.  
The results of a period appear on the screen graphically and in numbers. Figure 1 shows 
an example of the graph a subject could see – the text is in Dutch. This was a treatment where 
each subject had a maximum of 9 units to supply. The graph shows the results for period 3 
(shown at the bottom on the right), where 303 =td  and 13=rtp  were realized (bottom left) 
and this subject sold 7 units (bottom center). The graph shows the realized demand function 
(including the price cap), the price (light colored line) and the 9 supply prices submitted by 
this subject for this round (rising from 6 to 22). The 7 units sold by the subject are shown in  
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Figure 1: Screenshot of Period Results 
Notes. Translation from Dutch: Prijs = Price; Verkocht/Vraag = Sold/Demand; Verkocht door u = Sold by you; 
Toon periodes = Show periods. 
 
dark gray; the 2 that were not sold are light gray.8 Notice that this subject was willing to sell 
her 8th unit at price 13 as well, but other subjects had also submitted units at this price. In this 
case the computer randomly appoints subjects to slots on the aggregate supply function.9 
 The three treatment variables presented above (load ratio, industry capacity and symmetry 
of capacity) are varied between subjects. Table 1 presents an overview of these treatments 
and the number of markets we ran for each of them. In addition, it gives the average subject 
earnings for each treatment.  
Table 1: Treatment Overview 
  
Low Capacity: 
Smax=36 
High Capacity: 
Smax =48 
  
Symmetric: 
4,..,1,9max == js j  
Symmetric: 
4,..,1,12max == js j  
Asymmetric: 
215 ,j,smaxj ==  
4319 ,j,smaxj ==  
Low: l=4/7 lsl; n=6; €45.14 hsl; n=6; €15.89 -- Load 
Ratio High: l=6/7 lsh; n=5; €67.13 hsh; n=5; €27.28 hah; n=6; €43.60 
Notes. The entries in the cell show the acronym, xyz (x=capacity, y=symmetry and z=load ratio); the 
number of markets we have data for, n; and the average earnings in euro (€). 
 
 
Note that this simple design allows us to investigate the role of pivotal suppliers in a 
straightforward manner. First, in treatments hsl and hsh no single firm is pivotal because any 
three firms can cover maximum demand (dmax=35). Second, lsl and lsh deal with the case 
where every firm is pivotal for at least some possible demand quantities: together the four 
firms have sufficient capacity for maximum demand, but three firms can only supply 27 
                                                          
8 Subjects did not receive information about the offer price of units sold by other suppliers; we considered this to be closest 
to what happens in the field. 
9 We use pro-rata on the margin rationing in the experiments. This scheme for rationing supply is commonly used in 
wholesale electricity auctions. The way in which excess supply is rationed may have an impact on bidding; see Kremer and 
Nyborg (2004) for a theoretical analysis. 
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units. Third, hah covers the situation where two of the four firms (i.e., firms 3 and 4) are 
pivotal. Any combination of three firms including these two suffices for maximum demand 
but a combination of firms 1 and 2 with either 3 or 4 can only supply 29 units. Finally, note 
the large variation in earnings. This is a first indication that market power matters. 
 The experiment was conducted in seven sessions at the CREED laboratory for experimen-
tal economics of the University of Amsterdam. 112 subjects were recruited by public 
advertisement on campus and were mostly undergraduate students in economics, business 
and law. They were allowed to participate in only one experimental session. Each session 
lasted for about 2-3 hours. Earnings in the experiment were denoted in experimental francs. 
We used an exchange rate of 250 francs to 1 euro. All subjects received a starting capital of 
1250 francs, which was part of their earnings. There was no show-up fee. Subjects earned 
between €12.40 and €112.20 with an average of €42.71. 
 At the outset of each session, subjects were randomly allocated to the laboratory terminals 
and were asked to read the instructions displayed on their screens.10 Then they were 
introduced to the computer software and given five trial rounds to practice with the 
software’s features. Subjects were told that during these trial rounds other subjects’ decisions 
would be simulated by the computer, which was programmed to make random decisions, and 
that gains or losses made during those rounds would not count for their final earnings from 
participation. Once the five trial rounds were over, the pool of subjects was divided into 
independent groups (markets) of 4 subjects.  
 Each session then consisted of 25 repetitions (rounds), each round taking approximately 
3-4 minutes to be completed. In each session only one treatment was run with 5 or 6 groups 
per session. As mentioned at the beginning of the section, each round consisted of five 
periods, meant to correspond to different times of the day, with possibly different demand 
realizations. Subjects made supply decisions for each round; decisions were held fixed across 
the five periods within the round. 
 Subjects stayed in the same market for the whole session and did not know who of the 
other subjects were in the same market as themselves. The interaction in fixed groups 
approximates best actual circumstances in the kind of electric power markets that we are 
interested in. Fixed interaction is used in all previously cited experiments on electric power 
markets. The procedure has also the advantage that the observations from the different groups 
are statistically independent from each other. 
                                                          
10 A transcript of the instructions (translated from Dutch) is included in Appendix 1. 
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3. Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses 
As mentioned in the introduction, we center our theoretical analysis on a descriptive index, 
the RSI (Residual Supply Index) and two theoretical models, the MUA (multi-unit auction 
model) and SFE (supply function equilibrium model).  In this section we formulate specific 
hypotheses derived from these benchmarks. Our hypotheses will pertain to prices. In 
particular, we will use the volume weighted average price (VWAP, hereafter), which is 
defined as the monetary value of trades divided by the number of units traded per round. The 
VWAP provides a useful way to compare observed prices in experiments to theoretical 
predictions. Formally, let ( )p d  be the expected price when d units of output are demanded. 
The expected VWAP is defined as, 
  
35
20
( )
[ ]=
δ= ∑e
d
d p dP
E d
, 
where superscript e denotes expectation and δ is the probability of each possible demand 
level. 
The RSI is an indicator of market power given by the following expression: 
max max
3' ,S stotal capacity largest seller s capacityRSI
demand quantity d
−−= =  
where we have used the fact that in our notation seller j=3 has the highest capacity in all 
treatments (as does seller j=4). Table 2 shows the range of RSI for each of our treatments, as 
well as the midpoint of the interval. 
Table 2: RSI 
  Low Capacity High Capacity: 
  Symmetric: Symmetric:  Asymmetric: 
Low [0.71,1.25], 0.98, lsl [1.03,1.80], 1.415, hsl -- Load 
Ratio High [0.71,0.83], 0.77, lsh [1.03,1,20], 1.115, hsh [0.83,0,97], 0.90, hah 
Notes. The first entry in the cell shows the range within which the RSI falls for the various possible 
demand realizations in the treatment concerned. The second entry shows the midpoint of that interval. 
The third entry is the treatment acronym defined in table 1.  
 
If no firms are pivotal for any demand quantity, as in high-capacity treatments hsh and hsl, 
then the RSI exceeds one in all periods of all rounds; in this case any group of three firms has 
enough capacity to meet demand. If the largest firm is pivotal for all demand quantities, as in 
treatments lsh and hah, then the RSI is less than one for all periods of all rounds. For 
treatment lsl firms are pivotal for low demand quantities but not for high quantities. RSI is 
less than one for some periods and greater than one for other periods in treatment lsl. We 
expect treatments with higher average values of RSI to have lower market prices. 
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 The descriptive index is useful but has clear limitations, as it does not propose specific 
price levels for the different parameter configurations we analyze. The MUA and the SFE 
take us a bit further in this regard. Both models analyze the interaction between firms as a one 
shot strategic game, where the strategies consist of supply functions. Of course, the subjects 
in our experiment are engaged in a 25-round repeated game, so that the equilibrium 
prescriptions do not exactly pertain to the environment we study. However, as in many other 
studies the equilibria of the one shot game are relevant benchmarks, particularly given the 
known and finite time horizon we use. The central difference between the two models is that 
the MUA pertains to discrete production units while the SFE specifies continuously divisible 
output. 
 
MUA Predictions 
The MUA considers the game as an auction in which each firm j submits a vector of offer 
prices, selected from non-negative real numbers, for discrete units of output, .rjs  This game is 
analyzed in Anwar (1999) and Fabra, et al. (2006). For our parameters, this formulation 
yields pure strategy equilibria for treatments hsh, hsl, hah, and lsh; the equilibrium is in 
mixed strategies for treatment lsl. Details are given in Appendix 2.  
 Equilibria for high-capacity treatments hsh and hsl involve all firms offering their 
capacity at a price equal to marginal cost (c = 5), i.e., ,,,,5 krjpsrjk ∀=  yielding an equilibrium 
price trprt ,,5 ∀=  and profits .,,0 rjrj ∀=π  In other words, when none of the firms are 
pivotal, the MUA model predicts that competition will work perfectly with the equilibrium 
price equal to marginal cost. Our experimental setup involves discrete price units 
{5,6,…,25,26}, rather than prices chosen from a continuum. For high-capacity treatments our 
experiments have equilibrium prices equal to either 5 or 6. 
 Pure strategy equilibria of MUA for hah and lsh involve asymmetric strategies, in which 
3 firms offer all units at a low price, and the 4th firm (one of the two high-capacity firms for 
hah) offers all of its units at 25 (the price cap). The equilibrium price is equal to 25 for all 
demand realizations. The firm submitting high-price offers earns lower expected profit than 
its rivals; the low-price offers of rivals leave the high-price firm with no incentive to reduce 
its offers. These equilibria embody maximal exercise of market power; firms extract the 
maximum possible surplus in equilibrium.11  
                                                          
11  This effect of the asymmetric distribution of capacities is reminiscent of the price competition environment with capacity 
constraints studied experimentally by Davis and Holt (1994). With a symmetric distribution of capacity the (pure strategy) 
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 In treatment lsl firms are pivotal for high demand quantities, but not for low demand 
quantities. There are no pure strategy equilibria of the MUA for lsl. Fabra, et al (2006) derive 
a mixed strategy equilibrium for the case in which firms are restricted to make a single price 
offer for their capacity. However, Anwar (1999) shows that mixing over a single offer is not 
an equilibrium when each firm can make distinct offers for multiple units. We are not aware 
of analytical results for mixed strategy equilibria of MUA in which each firm can submit 
multiple offers. However, we can provide bounds on mixed strategy prices. Our experiment 
requires firms to submit offers in discrete price units from the set {5,6,…,25,26}; a unit 
offered at 26 will not be accepted and is equivalent to withholding the unit. Each firm 
submits offers for 9 units. A firm’s strategy is a non-decreasing offer schedule for 9 units; 
each firm has a finite set of strategies to choose from.12 It is well known that any finite n-
person non-cooperative game has at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In Appendix 
2 we show that expected equilibrium profit for a seller has a positive lower bound. This profit 
bound permits us to bound the equilibrium VWAP for treatment lsl: 11.55≥eP .  
 
SFE Predictions 
The second theoretical approach permits firms to submit continuous supply functions to an 
auctioneer. Klemperer and Meyer (1989) formulate and analyze game-theoretic models in 
which demand is uncertain and strategies are continuous, non-decreasing supply functions for 
infinitely divisible output. A Nash equilibrium for such a game is termed a Supply Function 
Equilibrium (SFE). Genc and Reynolds (2010) extend the SFE analysis of Klemperer and 
Meyer to permit capacity constraints and supply functions with discontinuities (e.g., step 
functions).  
 The SFE formulation has been used in a number of studies to predict behavior in naturally 
occurring wholesale electricity markets (Green 1999; Newbery 1998; Baldick et al. 2004; 
Bolle 2001) in which suppliers submit offers for discrete units of output. Output is not 
infinitely divisible in our experiments either. Each firm (subject) submits offers for between 5 
and 19 discrete units of output, depending on the treatment. This permits us to explore 
whether or not the SFE model provides useful predictions of behavior in an environment with 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
equilibrium price is equal to marginal cost, while for a certain asymmetric distribution of the same capacity the equilibrium 
prices are above marginal cost. 
12  The strategy set is finite, but very large. There are 14,307,150 strategies to choose from.  
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discrete units. In addition, our experiments permit us to compare the predictive power of the 
SFE model to that of the MUA model in a particular setting.13 
 Details of the SFE method applied to our parameters are presented in Appendix 3. Here, 
we present the main results derived from this theory. The first point to make is that Nash 
equilibrium pure strategies of the MUA model are also equilibrium strategies of the SFE 
model. Second, the SFE model admits additional pure strategy equilibria compared to the 
MUA model.  
 Consider our high-capacity hsh and hsl treatments. The only equilibrium for the MUA 
model has price equal to marginal cost (or one tick above marginal cost, for discrete prices); a 
firm has an incentive to undercut any rival offers that are above marginal cost. However, with 
infinitely divisible output, if a firm’s rivals submit smooth upward sloping supply curves then 
the firm’s best response is to offer its supply at prices above marginal cost. Klemperer and 
Meyer (1989) show that in general there are multiple supply function equilibria and these 
equilibria involve non-negative price-cost markups; a SFE with positive markups is 
sometimes referred to as an implicitly collusive equilibrium. Supply function equilibria for 
some of the treatments are illustrated in Figure 2. For hsh and hsl any aggregate supply func- 
 
 Figure 2: Aggregate Supply Functions for SFE 
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Notes. The curves show possible aggregate supply curves for smooth supply function equilibria. The 
vertical dashed line at Q=35 indicates maximum demand dmax. For hsh and hsl, any curve between A 
and B constitutes a SFE. For lsh and lsl the set of aggregate supply curves for smooth SFE is reduced to 
the curves between A and some curve C, above curve B. 
                                                          
13  Under some market rules, one theory may be much more suitable than the other. If market rules limit firms to submitting 
offers with one or two steps, then the MUA model seems more appropriate than SFE. Some market rules allow firms to 
submit upward sloping supply functions. For example, the Southwest Power Pool RTO runs an energy balancing market in 
which each firm submits multiple price-quantity pairs. This RTO interpolates linearly between pairs to yield a piece-wise 
linear, upward sloping supply curve for the firm. See: http://www.spp.org/section.asp?group=328&pageID=27. A SFE 
model would seem more appropriate than a MUA model for such market rules. 
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tion between (and including) the two bold curves indicated by A and B is consistent with a 
SFE.14 
 One way to characterize supply function equilibria is by the equilibrium price they 
generate when dmax is realized, i.e., )35(max
r
d
r
t sp = . As illustrated in Figure 2, the set of SFE 
for hsh and hsl is characterized by ]25,5[)35( ∈rs , i.e., the price at maximum demand can lie 
anywhere between the competitive price and the Cournot price, which in this case is the same 
as the monopoly price. 
 Consider now treatments lsh and lsl for which each firm is pivotal; other firms cannot 
fully compensate if one firm withholds units. The market power induced in these treatments 
has as a consequence that supply functions at or near marginal cost for all units for all firms 
are not equilibrium strategies. In fact only the aggregate supply functions between some 
function C, above B, and A are SFE for these low capacity treatments (cf. figure 2). More 
specifically, for lsh, functions characterized by ]25,21[)35( ∈rs are SFE and for lsl this holds 
for functions with ]25,18[)35( ∈rs .  
 For lsh we have to also consider non-smooth SFE. If one allows firms to submit non-
smooth step-function supply functions (formally, right-continuous functions of price) then the 
asymmetric equilibria of the MUA with price equal to 25, in which 3 firms offer all units at a 
low price and the 4th firm offers all of its units at 25 are also SFE for treatment lsh (but not 
for any of the other treatments with symmetric capacity distribution).  
 For treatment hah the asymmetric equilibria of the MUA, with one of the two high-
capacity firms bidding in all units at a price of 25 (yielding price equal to 25 for all demand 
realizations), are also supply function equilibria. There are additional supply function 
equilibria for treatment hah with prices below the price cap. In these equilibria, low-capacity 
firms offer all units at a low price and high-capacity firms have upward sloping (in fact, 
linear) supply functions, which are between supply curves A and B in Figure 3; 
]25,9.11[)35( ∈rs  for these equilibria. 
 Table 3 summarizes the theoretical predictions from the two approaches in terms of 
volume weighted average prices (
e
P ). In summary, the MUA yields very precise predictions 
for four out of five cases, but only mixed strategy equilibria for treatment lsl. SFE predictions 
                                                          
14  We refer to a SFE in which the aggregate supply function is differentiable over the range of possible demand quantities as 
a smooth SFE. For example, supply function equilibria associated with aggregate supply functions labeled A and C in figure 
2 are smooth. 
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Figure 3: SFE for Asymmetric Capacity Treatment 
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Notes. The small firms submit low price offers for their entire capacity, jointly 10 units (in 
the graph, these low offers are set equal to 5, but they may be larger than the marginal costs). 
Each large firm submits a linear, increasing supply function. The aggregate supply function is 
horizontal for units 1 – 10 and increases after unit 10. The most competitive of these 
equilibria reaches a price of 11.9 at dmax =35; the aggregate supply is labeled B. The least 
competitive of these equilibria reaches the price cap of 25 at dmax =35; the aggregate supply is 
labeled A.   
 
Table 3: Theoretical Predictions of Volume Weighted Average Price 
 low load ratio high load ratio 
Capacity: MUA SFE SFE: midpoint 
SFE: payoff 
dominant MUA 
SFE 
 
SFE: 
midpoint 
SFE: payoff 
dominant 
High 
symmetric {5, 6} [5, 16.4] 10.7 16.4 {5, 6} [5, 21.3] 13.2 21.3 
Low 
symmetric > 11.6 [12.4, 16.4] 14.4 16.4 {25} 
[18, 21.3] 
& {25} 19.7 25 
High 
asymmetric n.a. n.a. n.a n.a {25} 
[11.2, 23.1] 
& {25} 17.2 25 
Notes. The SFE refinements (midpoint and payoff dominant) are described in the main text. 
 
include the pure strategy equilibrium predictions of MUA, as well as additional predictions of 
intervals of average prices that are based on smooth supply function equilibria.  
 We will also apply two refinements to SFE and investigate how well they organize the 
data we observe. First, the ‘midpoint equilibrium’ selects the mean SFE in the range of 
symmetric SFE. This is an easy heuristic that attempts to predict average behavior across 
markets, assuming that distinct SFE occur with more or less equal probability. Second, the 
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‘payoff-dominant’ equilibrium is the SFE with the highest VWAP. This has the intuitive 
appeal of being best for the players concerned. Both refinements are given in table 3.15 
 We will use these theoretical predictions to organize our data on volume-weighted-
average prices in several ways. We will study whether observed prices remain within the 
interval prescribed by the SFE and, if so, whether they are well approximated by the more 
extreme predictions of the SFE refinements or the MUA model, all shown in table 3. 
 In addition, we will take a more qualitative look at the data and test a set of formal 
hypotheses about the comparative static effects that the results in table 3 predict for our 
treatment variables. The null hypothesis we use as a benchmark stems from the naive view 
that prices should not be expected to differ across treatments, since in all our treatments total 
capacity is sufficient to serve the maximum demand,. The distinct alternative hypotheses are 
based on both the midpoint values of the RSI (table 2) and the predictions that have been 
derived using MUA and the two SFE refinements (table 3). The comparisons we perform 
pertain to the distinguished treatment variations of total capacity, capacity distribution and 
demand load factor and to the direct comparison of the two ways in which pivotal power is 
present in our design. 
  In the following hypotheses xP  stands for the volume weighted average price in 
treatment x. The first two hypotheses refer to the symmetric reduction of capacity, with a 
high and low demand load factor respectively: 
 
1. With a high load ratio, the presence of pivotal firms, due to symmetrically distributed 
low total capacity, increases average prices (predicted by RSI, MUA and both SFE 
refinements). Formally: 
   H10:     lshhsh PP =   vs. H11:    lshhsh PP <     
 
2.  With a low load ratio, market power caused by a symmetric reduction in capacity 
causes an increase in average prices (predicted by RSI, MUA and the midpoint SFE 
refinement). Formally: 
    H20:    lslhsl PP =    vs. H21:    lslhsl PP <   
 
                                                          
15Alternatively, one may think that the set of SFE equilibria could  be refined by a restriction to linear supply functions (as 
demonstrated by Klemperer and Meyer 1989). This refinement only works with linear, downward sloping demand and linear 
marginal cost, however. In our environment such an approach does not refine the set of SFE equilibria. 
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The next hypothesis refers to the change in distribution of the high total capacity level for the 
high demand load factor. 
 
3.  With a high load ratio, the presence of pivotal firms, due to asymmetrically 
distributed high total capacity, increases average prices (predicted by RSI, MUA and 
both SFE refinements). Formally: 
    H30:    hahhsh PP =  vs.   H31:  hahhsh PP <   
 
The next hypothesis refers to the two ways in which pivotal power can appear.  
 
4. With a high load ratio, market power caused by a symmetric reduction in capacity has 
a stronger effect on average prices than market power caused by asymmetry 
(predicted by RSI and midpoint-refined SFE). Formally: 
    H40:    hahlsh PP =      vs. H41:  hahlsh PP >  
 
The RSI predicts a shift simply because the aggregate capacity that is left after a pivotal 
supplier withdraws his capacity from the total is smaller under lsh than under hah. The 
midpoint-SFE picks this up; some of the lower prices that are equilibrium for the hah 
treatment are not part of the equilibria for lsh. In contrast, the MUA model and the payoff-
dominant SFE do not suggest a difference between these two cases; both ways of introducing 
pivotal power lead to the same (asymmetric) equilibrium with the highest possible price. 
 The two remaining pair-wise comparisons pertain to the impact of changing the load 
factor.  
 
5.  With a high symmetric capacity, the change from a low to a high load factor yields
 higher prices (predicted by RSI and both SFE refinements). Formally: 
    H50:    hslhsh PP =      vs. H51:  hslhsh PP >  
 
6.  With a low symmetric capacity, the change from a low to a high load factor leads to 
higher prices (predicted by RSI, MUA and both SFE refinements). Formally: 
    H60:    lsllsh PP =      vs. H61:  lsllsh PP >  
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Observe that both the RSI and the midpoint SFE refinement prescribe a directional shift for 
all the cases we consider. The prescriptions of the MUA and of the payoff-dominant SFE do 
not change for two of the parameter changes.  
 
4.  Results 
We start with a general qualitative overview of the supply functions submitted by our 
subjects. This is followed by an analysis of the aggregate supply functions. We then present 
data on average volume weighted average prices, compare them with the equilibrium 
predictions and formally test our hypotheses H1-H6. In the latter part of the section we 
analyze individual best responses and assess the theoretical predictions of the two models. 
 When submitting their individual supply functions, subjects typically submitted all units 
that they had available. In the low capacity treatments (where each subject had a capacity of 9 
units) on average 8.9 units were offered at a price lower than or equal to pmax (=25). In the 
symmetric high capacity cases (12 units each) on average 11.7 units were offered. In the 
asymmetric treatment hah (two firms with 5 units and two with 19) the low capacity firms 
always offered all units whereas the firms with high capacity on average offered 18.6 out of 
19 units at a price lower than or equal to 25. This is an indication that attempts to exert 
market power were done by offering units at high prices, not by withholding them 
altogether.16  
 Figure 4 gives the average aggregate supply function per treatment, distinguishing 
between the low load ratio and high load ratio cases. In both panels the ranking of the 
functions, in relation to the load factor, is the same. The highest prices are asked for the low 
capacity treatments lsh and lsl and the lowest for the symmetric high capacity cases hsh and 
hsl. The supply function for the asymmetric capacity case lies somewhere in between, in the 
top panel.  
 
                                                          
16 Across all treatments, in 82.2% of the rounds the aggregate supply function offered the maximum total capacity at prices 
lower than or equal to 25. 
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Figure 4: Aggregate Supply Functions 
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Notes: The lines show the average supply function across all rounds for a high load ratio (top panel) 
and low load ratio (bottom panel). The window with dashed contour shows the area [dmin,dmax] within 
which demand may vary. Rounds are indicated on the horizontal axes, prices on the vertical axes. 
 
Table 4 shows volume weighted average prices both for all rounds and for the last 5 rounds, 
averaged over all groups of each treatment, together with the equilibrium predictions for the 
two models we consider. Focus first on the two cases with high symmetric capacity, hsh and 
hsl. For both load factors prices are within the range of the SFE predictions, but below the 
two refinements and above the prediction of the MUA. Note also that prices are lower in the 
last five rounds than in earlier rounds. This means that they are moving away from the SFE 
refinements and in the direction of the MUA predictions. For low symmetric capacity with 
the high load factor – lsh - prices are again within the interval of the SFE. They are close to  
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Table 4: Predicted and Actual Volume Weighted Average Prices  
 
 Equilibrium Predictions Actual 
 MUA SFE SFE: midpoint
SFE: 
payoff 
dominant 
All 
rounds 
Last 5 
rounds 
High Load Ratio       
  High Sym Cap (hsh) {5,6} [5, 21.3] 13.2 21.3 10.48   9.14 
  Low Sym Cap (lsh) {25} [18,21.3]&{25} 19.7 25 20.34 19.95 
  High Asym Cap (hah) {25} [11.2,23.1]&{25} 17.2 25 14.48 13.48 
Low Load Ratio       
  High Sym Cap (hsl) {5,6} [5, 16.4] 10.7 16.4   8.09   6.98 
  Low Sym Cap (lsl) > 11.6 [12.4, 16.4] 14.4 16.4 16.50 17.91 
 
the SFE midpoint refinement and below the MUA and SFE payoff dominant predictions (the 
latter two are equal). For lsl, observe that prices are somewhat above the upper limit of the 
SFE interval and therefore above both refinements. They are also above the lower limit of the 
mixed-strategy equilibrium support. Finally, for the high asymmetric case, hah, prices are 
within the SFE interval and below all point predictions.17 Formal tests of differences in 
average VWAP are presented below, when we discuss the results for our hypotheses testing.  
 Given that average prices are (slightly) different in the final five rounds than across all 
rounds, the dynamics of the VWAP may be important. Therefore, we now examine how these 
prices changed across rounds. Figure 5 presents their development across rounds, separately 
for each treatment. Starting with the symmetric treatments, figure 5 shows that prices for both 
low capacity treatments lsl and lsh are substantially and consistently above those for the high 
capacity treatments hsl and hsh. The differences increase over rounds: the primary reason is 
that average prices for high symmetric capacity treatments decrease steadily.  
 Comparing hsh to hsl one can see that prices for the former are above those for hsl in all 
rounds. In addition, average prices in these high symmetric capacity experiments are above 
the (highest) MUA prediction of 6 in all rounds. Thus, aggregate behavior in these high 
symmetric capacity experiments appears to be inconsistent with MUA predictions, although 
prices may be slowly moving toward the MUA prediction over time. We will explore this 
issue further when we examine data from individual markets. The ordering of average prices 
in hsh and hsl would be consistent with a single upward sloping aggregate supply function in 
a SFE. This is true because the low demand realizations in hsl would cut the aggregate supply 
curve at prices below the clearing prices for hsh. 
                                                          
17 The fact that prices stay away from the extreme predictions of the MUA could be attributed to a behavioral tendency not 
to choose prices at the edges of the choice space. However, it is worth pointing out here that in experiments with the double 
auction and the box demand design prices often do go all the way to the extremes (Davis and Holt, 1993). 
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Figure 5: Development of Volume Weighted Average Prices 
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Notes. For each treatment the graph shows the volume weighted average price at each round.  
 
 Average prices for the low symmetric capacity treatments (solid lines in Figure 5) vary 
across rounds, but tend to stay within to slightly above the intervals predicted for smooth SFE 
(see Table 4). Note that average prices for lsh are inconsistent with the MUA prediction of 
25. Their dynamics show no tendency toward this prediction. Average prices for lsl are 
consistent with the MUA prediction, in the sense that they are above the lower bound 
prediction for the mixed strategy MUA equilibrium. 
 Finally, average prices for hah vary over rounds but tend to lie within the interval of 
equilibrium prices for smooth SFE. In later rounds, average prices are in the lower portion of 
this predicted interval. Average prices for hah are clearly inconsistent with the pure strategy 
equilibrium prediction of 25 for MUA. If anything, they are converging away from this 
predicted level. 
 We conclude that the time trends in our data could be interpreted as convergence in the 
direction of the MUA prediction only in the symmetric high capacity cases. Even in these 
cases, this predicted level has not been reached, even after 25 rounds. As for the two SFE 
refinements, a comparison between figure 5 and the predictions in table reveals that the data 
do not appear to be converging towards either prediction in any of the treatments. 
 Figure 5 aggregates observations across markets but disaggregates across rounds. We do 
the reverse in figure 6, which shows average prices across rounds separately for each market.    
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Figure 6: Average Price per Market 
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Notes. Markers denote the volume weighted average price per market across all rounds (triangles) or last five 
rounds (crosses). Rectangles and lines connecting rectangles denote SFE predictions. Ovals and the dashed line 
between the two ovals for lsl denote MUA predictions. The SFE midpoint refinement is found at the middle 
point of each SFE line. The payoff dominant SFE is the ‘highest’ rectangle for each treatment. 
To highlight the effects of learning we distinguish between the average across all rounds and 
the average across the final five rounds. This figure confirms that just like the aggregate 
prices (figure 5), the average prices per market lie largely within the bounds predicted by 
SFE. In the absence of market power, the observations for hsh and hsl appear to be drawn 
towards the competitive prices predicted by MUA. For each of these two treatments, all 
groups but one had average prices near the MUA prediction for the last five rounds. For the 
treatments with market power, the observations appear to be more or less uniformly spread 
over the predicted interval of smooth SFE prices.18 
Our symmetric, high-capacity treatments (hsh and hsl) are similar in some respects to the 
multi-unit sales auction experiments reported on in Sefton and Zhang (2010). In their no-
communication treatment, they find that subjects’ bids converge to the discrete-units Nash 
equilibrium prediction of bids equal to values. By contrast, some offers remained above the 
discrete-units Nash prediction of offers equal to marginal cost for some groups in our hsh and 
hsl treatments. Factors that might account for the differences in results include relatively 
                                                          
18 Note that for lsh there is one group that has VWAP at the MUA prediction of 25 in the last 5 rounds. In the MUA 
equilibrium, three firms offer all units at a low price and one firm offers all units at a price of 25. The data for this group 
reveal that there are two firms offering all units at a low price and two firms offering at the price cap. 
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greater excess capacity in Sefton and Zhang and a random demand quantity in our 
experiments compared to the fixed sales quantity in Sefton and Zhang.  
 We now move to the tests of the hypotheses 1 to 6 about differences in prices across 
treatments presented in section 3. Table 5 presents the results of Mann-Whitney tests for all 
pairwise differences in means across the five treatments. It takes the (volume weighted) 
average price per market (across all rounds) as the unit of observation. The p-values 
pertaining to our six hypotheses are shown in italics.19 For the hypotheses, we only need to 
consider these results. Observe that five out of six of the differences in italics are statistically 
significant at the 10%-level or better (four are significant at the 1%-level) and therefore 
support the alternative hypotheses against the null of no differences in average prices.  
 
Table 5: Pairwise Mann-Whitney Tests for Volume Weighted Average Prices 
 hsl hah lsh lsl 
hsh 0.137 0.089 0.004 0.009 
hsl - 0.002 0.002 0.001 
hah - - 0.002 0.032 
lsh - - - 0.002 
 
Notes. Cell entries give the p-value for the Mann-Whitney test for the null hypothesis that the dif-
ference in means between the treatments in the row and column concerned are equal to zero. Results 
in italics are relevant for the hypotheses developed in section 3, as explained in the main text.  
 
We summarize the results of our hypotheses testing in the following way: 
 (1) for H1-H3, the alternative hypotheses are supported: symmetrically decreasing 
capacity (with either load ratio) and asymmetrically redistributing a given total capacity (with 
the high load ratio) all have the positive effects on prices predicted by the RSI and both 
theoretical models. In other words, when the RSI, MUA and at least one SFE refinement all 
yield the same comparative static prediction, this is confirmed by our data. 
 (2) for H4, the alternative hypothesis is supported: with a high load ratio, market power 
caused by a symmetric reduction in capacity has a stronger effect than market power caused 
by asymmetry; this is in accordance with the hypothesis based on the RSI and the SFE 
midpoint refinement, while MUA and the payoff-dominant SFE are mute on this particular 
comparison.  
 (3) for H5, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected: with high symmetric capacity the 
change from a low to a high load ratio does not significantly affect prices, an effect predicted 
both by RSI and the two SFE refinements. 
                                                          
19 As mentioned in section 3 we only evaluate separate variations of the different treatment variables. 
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 (4) for H6, the alternative hypothesis is supported: for low symmetric capacity, the 
change in load ratio does lead to higher prices, an effect predicted by RSI, MUA and both 
SFE refinements.  
 
Next, we consider the matter of who is exerting market power. We focus on the firm that 
determines the supply price of the 35th unit. If this is the same firm in every round, then in 
some sense behavior within a market is stable. However, if market power is being exerted, 
the firm supplying this unit will typically have lower earnings than other firms in the round 
concerned.20 Table 6 shows the extent to which the price of the 35th unit was determined by 
one or two firms in the market. 
 
Table 6:  Firms Determining sr(35) 
 hsh hsl hah lsh lsl 
One firm 0.48 0.56 0.70 0.56 0.66 
Two firms 0.82 0.84 0.91 0.87 0.9 
Notes. For each treatment denoted in the first row, numbers give the average (across markets) 
fraction of the 25 rounds that the price of unit 35 was determined by a single firm (2nd row) or 
two (out of the four) firms (3rd row). 
 
Note that if all firms are equally likely to determine sr(35) the fractions in the 2nd row should 
all be approximately 0.25 and those in the third row approximately 0.5. This is obviously not 
the case. For the asymmetric treatment, hah, one may expect the two large firms to alternate, 
yielding fractions 0.5 and 1, respectively. On average there appear to be only small 
differences across the symmetric treatments. 50-60% of these prices are determined by a 
single firm in any market and two firms account for more than 80%. We conclude that there 
is a strong asymmetry in the bidding by distinct firms in a market. Even when all four firms 
have (equal) market power in lsh and lsl, (almost) 90% of the prices at unit 35 are determined 
by only 2 of the 4 firms. While we clearly observe heterogeneous bidding by subjects, it is 
not consistent with the MUA predictions of asymmetric equilibria for treatments lsh and hah. 
These equilibria involve low offers for all units by three subjects and all capacity of the 
fourth subject offered at the price cap. We did not observe this in lsh or hah markets. 
Now we take a closer look at the degree of rationality of the behavior we observe. Since 
we have detailed data on round-by-round offers submitted by subjects it is possible for us to 
                                                          
20 If other firms do not offer at high prices (as predicted for lsh by MUA, for example) then it may easily happen that the 
same firm provides the 35th unit, round after round. When market power is exerted in our experiments, such asymmetry 
typically did occur within a round. Here we analyze whether firms alternated in exerting such power across rounds or that it 
was typically the same firm that did so.  
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assess the extent to which individual choices are best responses to choices made by rival 
subjects. We would not expect outcomes in the experiment to be consistent with Nash 
equilibrium predictions unless subjects are making best responses to rivals’ choices. The 
game that subjects are playing is complex with a very large strategy set. Footnote 12 points 
out that the treatment with symmetric capacity of 9 units per subject has a strategy set with 
over 14 million choices; strategy sets for high capacity treatments are even larger. Both MUA 
and SFE predict multiple equilibria. In addition, our subjects have only limited feedback 
regarding auction results. After each period (there are 5 periods per round) subjects observe 
the market clearing price, the quantity demanded, and the position of their own offers in the 
aggregate offer queue; see Figure 1. Subjects do not directly observe the offers made by other 
subjects, although they may be able to infer approximate offers of rivals. Given the size of the 
strategy set, multiplicity of equilibria, and limited information feedback, it is not at all 
obvious that subjects would play best responses in the experiments. 
In order to assess individual choices we compare the actual profit of subjects to what we 
call ex-post optimal profit.21 We calculate the ex-post optimal profit for a subject in a round 
of play by finding an offer that yields the highest possible expected profit given the actual 
offers submitted by other subjects for that round.22 Note that a subject’s ex-post optimal offer 
in a particular round need not be unique. For example, if rival subjects submit relatively high 
offers then a subject’s best response would be any offer schedule that offers all units up to 
capacity at prices below rivals’ offers, allowing the market price to be dictated by rivals’ 
offers.23 
Table 7 summarizes results for actual profit as percent of ex-post optimal profit over all 
rounds for each subject. This figure ranged between 110 and 33 percent, with a median of 79 
percent across all 112 subjects in the experiments. There are differences in actual/ex post 
optimal profit across decision-making conditions. Differences across all symmetric 
treatments are statistically significant (KW, χ2=15.10, p=0.00, N=22), as are differences be- 
 
                                                          
21 A similar approach of comparing actual profit to ex-post optimal profit was used in Hortacsu and Puller (2008) in their 
examination of behavior of electricity generation suppliers in the Texas ERCOT wholesale power balancing market. We will 
compare the results of our analysis to theirs, below. 
22 The set of possible offer schedules for high-capacity subjects in hah is extremely large. For these subjects we approximate 
the best response in each round by sampling from the set of possible offers. 
23 Also note that “ex-post” refers to rivals’ offers rather than to demand realizations. An ex-post optimal offer schedule is 
optimal against actual offers made by rivals and against the ex-ante distribution of demand quantities. When we calculate 
actual profit and ex-post optimal profit we use the actual demand quantity realizations from experimental sessions. A 
consequence of using actual demand quantity realizations to calculate profits is that actual profit can exceed ex-post optimal 
profit for a subject in a round. 
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 Table 7: Actual Subject Profit as Percent of Ex-post Optimal Profit 
   #units Median Max Min 
high capacity (hsh) 12 72 87 33 symmetric low capacity (lsh) 9 85 100 75 
(hah-high capacity trader) 19 79 90 61 
high load 
ratio asymmetric (hah-low capacity trader) 5 89 110 77 
high capacity (hsl) 12 68 94 37 low load 
ratio symmetric low capacity (lsl) 9 83 100 66 
All subjects -- 79 110 33 
Notes. Numbers represent average/ex post optimal profit for the treatment concerned. Ex post optimal profits 
were calculated in the way described in the main text. The column #units gives the maximum number of units 
each trader had available to offer. To see why a ratio larger than 100 may occur, see footnote 23. 
 
tween high- and low-capacity subjects in the asymmetric treatment (MW, Z=2.21, p=0.03, 
N=6 paired observations). Subjects with a small amount of capacity (low capacity subjects in 
hah and subjects in treatments lsh and lsl) have higher average actual/ex post optimal profit 
than subjects with higher capacity (high capacity subjects in hah and subjects in treatments 
hsl and hsh). More specifically, from high to low, the treatment-average actual/ex post 
optimal profit is ordered as follows: 
 
hahlow >0.429 lsh >0.537 lsl >0.015 hahhigh >0.329 hsh >0.537 hsl  
 
where hahlow (hahhigh) refers to the low (high) capacity traders in hah and >xx indicates the p-
value of the Mann-Whitney test of the difference concerned (using market averages as units 
of observations). These tests confirm that the percent of actual to ex post optimal profit is 
significantly greater the lower the capacity per subject.24 In fact, the ‘turning point’ between 
high and low values seems to be between lsl and hahhigh, which is between traders without 
and with market power. It appears that the larger strategy sets associated with greater 
capacity (hence, more market power) contribute to a more complex decision making 
environment and greater departures from optimality. 
We also checked to see whether there is a time trend within experiments for actual as 
percent of optimal profit. This percentage was regressed on round number and dummy 
variables for treatments. The coefficient on round number is negative and not statistically 
significant (p-value is 15 %); actual as percent of optimal profit falls by about two percentage 
points over 25 rounds on average. This result is not supportive of learning of best responses 
over time during experiments, although there could be other learning taking place. 
                                                          
24 Additional tests show hahlow >0.041 lsl  and hahhigh >0.132 hsl. 
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Hortacsu and Puller (2008) conduct a similar analysis using market data and report on 
actual profit vs. ex post optimal profit for firms that offer electricity generation into the 
ERCOT wholesale power balancing market. It is possible to make these calculations because 
of the detailed information available about generation costs and about bids submitted by 
firms. They use data from a single trading period within each day (6 – 6:15 pm) for days that 
did not experience transmission congestion across zones within ERCOT. The reported results 
for actual to ex post optimal profit range from a high of 79 percent to a low of  − 81  percent; 
the median figure for the sample of 35 firms is 15 percent. This contrasts with results from 
our experiments; approximately half of our subjects achieved higher actual to ex post optimal 
profit than the firm with the highest percentage in the Hortacsu and Puller study. 
Hortascsu and Puller (2008) also found differences in performance across firms, but 
seemingly in the opposite direction of our experimental results. They find that large firms 
(those with a high volume of sales under ex post optimal bidding) have significantly higher 
actual/ex post optimal profit than smaller firms. Hortacsu and Puller attribute this result to the 
fixed costs associated with activities required in order to profit in the balancing market: 
acquiring information, analyzing information, and running a trading operation. The higher 
profit stakes available to larger firms made it worthwhile for them to invest in the fixed costs, 
but the lower profit stakes for small firms left them with weak incentives to invest. By 
contrast, subjects in our experiments did not bear any costs of participating in the market 
except perhaps the opportunity cost of their attention.  
This difference in results from the field and the laboratory are interesting.25 They point to 
the particular advantages both methods have. On the one hand, the advantage of laboratory 
control is that it allows us to isolate causal effects when comparing realized-profit-to-optimal-
profit ratios across distinct environments. They are less informative about the actual level of 
such ratios, however. For this, data from the field are more relevant. Moreover, our 
laboratory data allow us to isolate the effects of production capacity holding other 
characteristics (such as fixed costs) constant, while the field data allow for a comparison 
between large en small firms that take into account all differences between the two. 
                                                          
25  Our laboratory market experiments differ from the ERCOT energy balancing market in several ways. Subjects in our 
experiments make repeated decisions in markets with stable costs and capacities, and a fixed group of participants. The 
ERCOT market environment is considerably more complex. It involves costs and capacities that change from day to day 
(e.g., due to generation outages, fuel cost changes and contractual commitments), several different types of generation, start-
up and ramping costs for generation, and changes in the set of market participants over time. Given these differences 
between our experiments and the ERCOT environment, we would not necessarily expect to see similar ratios of actual to 
optimal profit. 
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As a final exercise, we turn to an assessment of the theoretical predictions of market prices 
that we distinguished between. The SFE and MUA models each provide equilibrium 
predictions of prices. We do not attempt to compare directly the predictive success of the 
MUA model to the complete set of equilibria predicted by the SFE model because the latter 
model predicts large intervals of equilibrium prices for every treatment and MUA equilibrium 
prices are a small subset of SFE prices for 4 out of 5 treatments. What we do instead is to 
simply report on test statistics for predictive success for MUA, for unrestricted SFE and for 
the two refinements of SFE distinguished above.  
The following statistical model is the basis for the tests. Let, 
 pij = average VWAP for group i of treatment j,  j ∈ {lsl, lsh, hsl, hsh, hah} 
 nj = number of groups for treatment j; n = Σj nj  
The data generating process is assumed to be: 
j
ij j ijp p ε= + , 
where  jjp  is the latent, underlying price for treatment j and εij is a zero mean random error 
term that reflects decision errors of subjects and/or aspects of subjects’ payoffs that are not 
controlled in the experiment. Each theory makes predictions about values for the jjp  terms.26 
We assume that error terms are normally distributed with unknown variance, σ2; let f(⋅) be the 
density function for error terms. Below we develop likelihood ratio tests for the theories. 
Each theoretical model makes predictions about prices for the 5 treatments. Let Pk  be the 
set of prices predicted by model k for the 5 treatments. The set Pk is a subset of the set of 5-
dimensional vectors of real numbers, i.e., Pk ∈ 5\ .  Define the following likelihoods:     
 i j j j j( ) j
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Lk is calculated by choosing latent prices from the set of predicted prices for the model that 
are closest to average prices for treatments and by choosing an error variance equal to the 
average squared deviation from the best predicted prices. L gives the unrestricted maximum 
                                                          
26  The data generating process could be modified so that actual prices are the minimum of the RHS and the price cap. This 
would be important if the data (group average prices) included observations equal to the price cap. Price is equal to the price 
cap for some individual rounds in experiments, but none of the observed group average prices are at the price cap. 
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likelihood; latent prices are equal to treatment average prices and error variance is equal to 
sample variance. The likelihood ratio statistic for model k is λk = Lk/L. For large n, the 
distribution of the test stratistic −2ln(λk), approaches the chi-square distribution with 6 
degrees of freedom. Table 8 reports results for tests of the hypothesis that latent prices for 
treatments are in the set of equilibrium prices predicted by theoretical models. We use a 95  
 
Table 8: Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Model  Test Statistic
−2ln(λk) 
2
.05,6χ  
MUA 57.44 12.59 
unrestricted 0.01 12.59 
midpoint 19.98 12.59 SFE 
Pareto dominant 69.52 12.59 
Notes. Test results are based on the likelihood functions described in eq. (1).  Prices used 
are group averages, therefore n = 28 observations. 
  
percent confidence interval for the tests. Values of the test statistic that are larger than 2.05,6χ  
therefore reject the null hypothesis that our data are generated by the model concerned. 
We observe that the only model that is not rejected by the test is the unrestricted SFE 
model, for which we calculate λSFE=0.993, yielding a test statistic close to zero. This result 
reflects that there are SFE equilibrium price predictions that are either equal to or close to 
average observed prices for each treatment. For the restricted SFE models and the MUA 
model we find that the test statistics exceed the χ2 statistic and therefore reject the hypothesis 
that observed group average prices are drawn from distributions with mean values in the 
equilibrium sets for these models. As mentioned above, this higher predictive power if the 
unrestricted SFE model comes at a cost, however. The unrestricted SFE model is far less 
parsimonious than either of its refinements or the MUA alternative. The bottom line remains, 
however, that we have found no more parsimonious model capable of organizing our data in 
a satisfactory way. 
 
5. Concluding Discussion 
We set out to experimentally study the effects of pivotal power, motivated both by the results 
of empirical field data studies and by the predictions of recent theoretical models. A first 
conclusion from our experiments is that the more fundamental intuitions about the impact of 
pivotal power are supported by our data. Prices are higher when (some) firms are pivotal. The 
existence of aggregate excess capacity is not enough to guarantee competitive prices. This 
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general result is accordance both with the predictions of the intuitive RSI and of the SFE 
model based on divisible output and MUA model based on discrete output units. 
 Our experiments also permit us to assess in more detail the predictive power of these 
theoretical models as well as of two refinements of the SFE model. The MUA model 
provides sharp equilibrium predictions for 4 out of our 5 treatments; for these treatments the 
MUA predicts either competitive pricing or monopoly pricing. The SFE model predicts a 
larger set of equilibria that includes the sharp MUA equilibria as well as additional equilibria 
based on upward sloping supply functions. One can see the SFE model prescriptions as a 
more modest proposal for organizing observed behavior, in contrast to the more stringent 
prescriptions of the MUA model and of the two refinements of SFE that we considered. On 
the other hand, as we argued above, this more general SFE model is not very parsimonious. It 
appears that none the three ways that we tried to achieve more parsimony were able to 
maintain the SFE’s ability to capture our data. Naturally, one could consider alternative 
refinements. We can think of no obvious one, however. As discussed above, the MUA and 
the two we consider come easily to mind.  
 We find that the additional equilibria of the SFE model proved necessary for explaining 
observed behavior in two principle ways. First, for treatments with no market power, 
observed supply functions are upward sloping and prices tend to remain above the 
competitive price prediction of the MUA. The implicitly collusive equilibria of the SFE 
capture this behavior. Neither of the two (other) SFE refinements we considered captures 
these patterns, however. The movement of prices toward marginal cost for most markets in 
two of our treatments, however, does appear to show dynamics in the general direction of the 
MUA prediction. Only in this weak way does the basic insight obtain support in our data, that 
the ‘implicitly collusive’ equilibria that arise with infinitely divisible offer prices and 
quantities are eliminated once some discreteness is introduced.  
 Second, the MUA model predicts monopoly pricing (at the price cap) for two of our 
market power treatments. Observed behavior in these two treatments is inconsistent with this 
sharp MUA prediction; behavior is more consistent with additional equilibria from the SFE 
that involve upward sloping supply functions and lower market prices. Once again, it is 
inconsistent with the two SFE refinements, however. As mentioned above, we do not think 
that the fact that prices stay away from the extreme predictions of the MUA can be simply 
explained by a behavioral tendency not to choose prices at the edges of the choice space. In 
double-auction experiments with the box demand design prices often do go all the way to the 
extremes. An additional consideration here is that our design involves a repeated game, albeit 
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a finite one. Given that repeated interaction can facilitate tacit collusion in experimental 
oligopoly settings (Abbink and Brandts, 2008), it is noteworthy that in our case it does not 
lead to the attainment of a monopoly price one-shot equilibrium. 
 As noted in the introduction, market power due to the presence of pivotal suppliers has 
been documented to contribute to high prices and inefficiency in wholesale electricity 
markets and is a significant concern for public policy toward the electric industry. Our 
experimental results are consistent with evidence from naturally occurring electricity markets 
that pivotal power contributes to higher market prices. An important finding, however, is that 
the exercise of market power by pivotal suppliers in our experiments was not as severe as 
equilibrium predictions of the MUA model. These predictions require that agents adopt 
strategies that support an asymmetric equilibrium with payoffs that differ substantially across 
agents (even for agents with identical costs and capacities). Experimental results for 
treatments with pivotal suppliers were more consistent with SFE predictions involving lower 
prices. 
 A final result that we wish to highlight here pertains to the effects of increasing the load 
factors. We find that when both models suggest that it will affect prices it does have this 
effect. We interpret this as indicating that the models do identify a potential influence factor, 
but that it only shows up in the data when it is a strong force. Stronger variations in demand 
reduce market power, in a situation where this power is otherwise strongest.    
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Appendix 1 
This appendix gives the English translation of the original Dutch instructions for the sessions 
with symmetrich high capacity (12 units per producer) and low load factor. The instructions 
were programmed as html pages. Horizontal lines indicate page separations. 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
You are about to participate in an economic experiment. The instructions are simple. if you 
follow them carefully, you can make a substantial amount of money. Your earnings will be 
paid to you in euro’s at the end of the experiment.  
 
In the experiment, we use the currency 'franc'. At the end of the experiment, we will 
exchange the francs for guilders. The exchange rate to be used is 1 euro for 250 francs. For 
each 1000 francs, you will therefore receive € 4. 
 
We will use numerical examples in these instructions. These are only meant to be an 
illustration and are irrelevant for the experiment itself.  
 
In these instructions, you may click on the links at the bottom of each page to move forward 
or backward. Sometimes, there will be more text on a page than can fit onto your screen. 
When that is the case, you can use the scroll bar on the right to move down.  
 
next page 
 
 
ROUNDS AND PERIODS 
 
The experiment will consist of 25 rounds today, preceded by 5 practice rounds. 
 
In the 25 rounds, you will be a member of a group. Aside from you, the group will consist of 
3 other people. The composition of the group is anonymous. You will not know who is in 
the group with you. Others will not know that you are in their group. The composition of 
your group is the same for the whole experiment. You will have nothing to do with people in 
other groups. 
 
In the experiment, you will participate in a market, in which fictitious goods will be produced 
and sold. The final consumers of the good will be simulated by the computer. All participants 
will be producers of the good. There are 4 producers in each group.  
 
In the practice rounds, you will not be in a group with other participants. The computer 
will simulate the choices of other group members. It does so in a completely random manner. 
You cannot learn anything about others' behavior from these simulated choices. 
 
Each round will consist of 5 periods. In each period, the computer will decide how many of 
the goods to buy. You do not need to do anything between periods. At the beginning of the 
round, you will decide how many units you are willing to produce and sell.  
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This choice will be valid in each of the 5 periods in that round. The remainder of these 
instructions will explain the market and the rules you must abide by. 
 
previous page  next page 
 
 
SIMULATED BUYERS 
 
In this experiment, the decisions to buy (fictitious) goods are not made by participants but by 
the computer. This will be done as follows. 
 
In each period, the computer will buy between 20 and 35 units of the good. Each number 
between 20 and 35 (inclusive) is equally likely. Because there are 16 integer numbers 
between 20 and 35, in each period there is a probability of 1/16 that any one of these number 
will be drawn. After a number has been drawn, it may be drawn again in a next period of a 
round.  
 
To determine the price that the computer will pay per unit bought in a period, it is determined 
at what (minimum) prices the group members are willing to sell each unit. Below, we will 
explain how this determines the price paid by the computer. 
 
The computer will never pay more than 25 francs per unit, however. If not enough sellers 
are willing to sell for a price lower than 25, the computer will buy as many as it can for 25 
francs. 
 
previous page  next page 
 
 
PRODUCTION AND COSTS 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, each participant will receive 1250 francs as a starting 
capital. You will see this amount on your screen when the experiment starts.  
 
In each round, each participant is a producer who must decide how many units of the good he 
or she wishes to produce. No producer is allowed to produce more than 12 units.  
 
For each unit a producer is willing to produce, he or she must determine the minimum price 
that he or she wishes to receive for that unit. We will call this the 'ask price'. How this is 
reported, will be explained shortly.  
 
There are costs related to producing goods. For each unit you produce, you must pay 5 
francs. 
 
previous page  next page 
 
 
ASK PRICES 
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For each unit you would like to offer, you need to indicate at what price (the 'ask price') you 
are willing to sell it. You may ask different prices for distinct units. For this, the following 
rules apply. 
 
If you offer a unit for sale, you must also offer all preceding units. For example, if you 
indicate a minimum price asked for unit 3, you must also offer units 1 and 2.  
 
Your price asked for a unit must always be higher than or equal to the price asked for the 
preceding unit. So: your ask price for the second unit may not be lower than for the first 
unit. Your ask price for the third unit may again not be lower than your ask price for the 
second unit, etc. Each producer can produce at most 12 units. 
 
Your ask price may be lower than the costs. Note that you may make a loss on that unit in 
that case. For example. assume that your price asked for the first three units is 3. Assume that 
the three units are bought by the computer at a price of 4. For each unit, your production costs 
are 5 and your revenue is 4, so you make a loss of 1. For the three units together, your loss is 
3.  
 
All units for which you ask a positive price are offered on the market. However, a unit is 
only sold if the computer is willing to pay your ask price for that unit. How this is determined 
will be discussed shortly. 
 
previous page  next page 
 
 
SUBMITTING YOUR ASK PRICES 
 
 
To enter your ask prices, you will use a window that looks like this. Note that you can only 
see the first 4 units. In the experiment, you will be able to scroll down to the other units. This 
is not possible in these instructions.  
 
The first column (nr) indicates the number of the unit. The second column (cost) gives the 
cost per unit (5). The next column (cumm) gives the total costs for that level of production. 
The last column (ask price) will be used to enter the minimum price you wish to receive for 
that unit.  
 
You indicate your willingness to sell units by entering the amount you want to receive in the 
column ask price. It is up to you to decide how many different numbers you wish to enter, as 
long as no ask price is lower than the preceding one. You may enter a different number for 
 34
each unit, the same for all units or anything in between. It is also up to you to decide how 
many units you want to offer. There is a maximum of 12, however. 
 
To help you when entering numbers, the following happens. If you enter a price for a unit, the 
same number is automatically entered in all previous units for which no number had been 
entered yet. For example, if you start by entering a price of 12 in unit 3, 12 is also entered in 
units 1 and 2. If you then enter 22 for unit 5, 1-3 stay at 12 but 22 is entered for unit 4. You 
may practice this in the practice rounds. Units where you do not enter a number are not 
offered for sale.  
 
When you are satisfied, you must confirm your choice. As long as you have not done so, 
you can still change every and any price asked. Note that your decision is not valid until you 
have confirmed. The experiment will not proceed until everyone has confirmed her or his 
production decision. You must also confirm if you wish to produce zero units. You do so by 
clicking the confirmation button without entering any numbers. 
 
previous page  next page 
 
 
DETERMINING THE PRICE PAID 
 
The price paid by the computer for any unit bought is often not equal to the ask price. The 
price paid is never lower than the ask price, however.  
 
After the computer has determined how many units it wants to buy in a period, it considers all 
the ask prices in your group of producers. It first buys the unit offered at the lowest price, 
then the second lowest price, etc. The price it pays is the same for all units bought. 
 
In each period of a round, the number of units the computer wants to buy is some randomly 
drawn quantity between 20 and 35.  
 
Example 
Let's say that in some period, the computer wants to buy 29 units. It then checks whether it 
can buy all 29 units at a price of 25 francs or less. If there at least 29 ask prices less than or 
equal to 25, the computer will buy all 29 units. If not, it will buy as many units as it can for 
25 francs. 
If there are at least 29 ask prices lower than or equal to 25, the computer chooses the 29 
lowest ask prices. The price paid is then equal to to the 29th ask price. For example, if 12 
units are offered for 10 francs, 10 units for 12 francs, and 10 units for 18 francs, the 29th 
price is 18 francs. All 29 units will be sold for 18 francs. Note that some units for which the 
ask price is 18 remain unsold, however. 
 
The same procedure holds for any other quantity (randomly) chosen by the computer. One 
way to picture how the price paid is determined is as follows. Consider all of the ask prices 
submitted by members of your group. Order them from low to high. Then count how many 
units can be sold for 25 francs or less.  
 
If this is less than the number chosen by the computer, then the price is 25 and all units with 
ask prices less than or equal to 25 are sold. 
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If this is more than or equal to the number chosen, the computer is able to buy the units it 
wants. It looks for the lowest price at which it can by all of these units. This is the price the 
computer pays for all units. Note that this price paid is the ask price of the last unit bought. 
For all other units bought the ask price is lower. For all units not bought, the ask price is at 
least as high as the price paid. 
 
previous page  next page 
 
 
5 PERIODS 
 
After everyone has confirmed their ask prices at the beginning of the round, the computer 
orders these from low to high. If two ask prices are equal, the computer randomly 
determines their order. Then, it runs the 5 periods of the round. In each period, it randomly 
determines the number of units it wants to buy. 
 
In every period, it determines which units are bought and what price is to be paid. It will 
show you the results for a few seconds and then move on to the next period. After the 5th 
period, you will be able to review all of the periods of the round at your own pace. The 
experiment will only proceed to the next round after all participants have indicated that 
they are ready. 
 
previous page  next page 
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RESULTS OF A PERIOD 
 
 
This is an example of how the results of a period will be shown to you.  
 
These are the results of period 5, which can be seen from the yellow square with a '5' in the 
bottom right corner. In this period, the price paid was 12 and the computer wanted to buy 20 
units. This participant sold 7 of these units. This information is given in the bottom left 
corner.  
 
The bars in the graph are the ask prices submitted by this participant. Notice that this 
participant offered (all) 12 units. The ask prices ranged between 5 and 16. Red bars indicate 
units that were sold in this period and grey bars indicate unsold units. The location of a bar is 
determined by its place relative to the ask prices of all participants, ordered from low to high. 
For example, the bar indicating an ask price of 5 is the 5th unit. This means that there were 
five units offered by other participants at ask prices of 5 or lower.  
 
The graph shows more details. The number of units the computer wanted to buy (20) is 
shown by the black line. This line also shows the maximum price of 25 francs. The price paid 
(12) is given by the horizontal yellow line in the graph. Notice that in this example the 
computer was able to buy all 20 units at a price lower than 25, because there are unsold units 
with an ask price less than 25. 
 
Note that you will not see what prices were asked by the other participants, only your 
own. Also note that this participant offered a unit at a price of 12 that was not sold, even 
though the price paid is 12. This can only be the case if at least one other producer entered an 
ask price of 12 and the computer (randomly) put that other unit before this one.  
 
previous page  next page 
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RESULTS OF A PERIOD 
 
 
After everyone has entered and confirmed their ask prices, a graph like this is shown for each 
of the 5 periods. Each period is shown for a few seconds. After the 5th period, you will be 
able to review any period by clicking on the numbers in the bottom right corner.  
 
You will have to indicate that you have finished reviewing all of the information of a round 
by clicking on a 'Ready' button (not shown here). We will not proceed to the next round 
until everyone has indicated that they are ready. 
 
previous page  next page 
 
 
RESULTS OF A PERIOD 
 
 
Here you see the 'Ready' button where you can indicate that you have finished reviewing the 
periods of a round.  
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You also see a table summarizing the results of a round. This will appear after period 5 has 
been completed by the computer.  
The table has one row for each period. The first column gives the period. The second column 
(demand) shows the quantity that the computer wants to buy in that period. If the number is 
in black, it was able to buy all units. If it is in red, there were not enough ask prices smaller 
than or equal to 25.  
 
Under the header 'price' you will find the price paid per unit in that period. The number of 
units sold by you is given in the column 'sold'.  
 
Your production costs (the number sold times 5) are given in the column 'costs'. Finally, your 
profit in this period (the price multiplied by the number sold minus your costs) is given under 
'profit'.  
 
Between the table and the 'Ready'-button, we give your aggregate earnings in this round. This 
is the sum of your profits in the five rounds.  
 
previous page  next page 
 
 
AGGREGATE EARNINGS 
 
During the whole experiment, a window in the op left corner will keep track of the round and 
period you are in. It also gives your aggregate earnings in francs. At the end of the 
experiment, your francs will be converted into euros.  
 
This brings you to the end of the instructions. You may now take your time to reread parts of 
the instructions. When you are satisfied that you understand them, you can indicate to us that 
you are finished, by clicking the 'ready' button at the bottom of this screen. After that, you 
may still page through the instructions. However, when everyone has indicated that they are 
ready, we will move on to the practice rounds. 
 
previous page   
back to first page  
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Appendix 2 – Equilibria of the MUA 
Treatments hsh and hsl: 
 Each seller has 12 units of capacity in these treatments. In hsh demand quantities have a 
discrete uniform distribution from 30 to 35; the distribution is from 20 to 35 for hsl. No seller 
is pivotal in these treatments. As a consequence, each seller offering all their units at 
marginal cost (c = 5) is a Nash equilibrium.  
 For our experimental environment with discrete price offers there are also equilibrium 
strategies involving some offers at 6 (one tick above marginal cost) that yield equilibrium 
prices equal to 6 for at least some demand realizations. Consider treatment hsh. Suppose that 
sellers select strategies such that  
1) 29 units are offered at 5,  
2) 19 units are offered at 6, and  
3) each seller offers at least 2 units at 5.  
Then the market clearing price is 6 for each demand outcome (since d > 30). First, note that 
no seller has an incentive to switch a unit offered at 5 to 6. When offered at 5 this unit is sold 
with probability one and has profit equal to one. When offered at 6 this unit is sold with 
probability less than one, with profit equal to one if sold. Second, one can show that no seller 
has an incentive to switch a unit offered at 6 to 5. While this switch increases the probability 
that the unit will be sold, this switch also reduces the average price and hence average profit 
on other units. On balance the impact of a lower average price outweighs the increased 
probability of selling the unit. 
 For treatment hsl there are equilibria that yield a market clearing price of 6 for high 
demand outcomes, but not for low demand outcomes.  
 
Treatments lsh and hah:   
 In lsh each seller has 9 units of capacity and demand quantities are d ∈ {30,31,…,35},  
with equal probabilities. Let seller j offer its entire capacity at the price cap; that is, 
max 25srlkp p= =  , for k = 1,…,9. Let sellers l ≠ j  choose offers, 17srlkp ≤ , for k = 1,…,9. Then 
the market price is 25 for each demand realization. Expected profit for seller j is, 
[ ] ( )max(25 5) 110j l
l j
E E d s
≠
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤π = − − =⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠∑ . 
Sellers l ≠ j  earn the maximum possible profit for a seller in this environment: 
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( ) max25 5 180j lE s⎡ ⎤π = − =⎣ ⎦ Seller j has no incentive to defect since she would have to reduce 
her offers to 17 or less in order to increase her quantity sold. Even if seller j sold her entire 
capacity at a price of 17 her payoff would be 108, which is less than the payoff of 110 
associated with the high price strategy. So the asymmetric strategies described above are 
Nash equilibrium strategies; see Fabra, et al (2006) for more details. There are four 
asymmetric equilibria of this type, with a different seller acting as the high price seller in 
each equilibrium. 
 In hah there are two small sellers, each with 5 units of capacity, two large sellers, each 
with 19 units of capacity, and demand quantities are d ∈ {30,31,…,35}, , with equal 
probabilities. Suppose that one of the large sellers offers their entire capacity at the price cap. 
This would ensure that the market price is at the price cap (25) for each possible demand 
realization. If the other three sellers offer all of their units at prices less than or equal to 8, the 
high price seller has no incentive to change their strategy. These strategies are a Nash 
equilibrium. There are two asymmetric Nash equilibria for hah, with one of the large sellers 
acting as the high price seller in each equilibrium. 
 
Treatment  lsl :   
 The only equilibrium is in mixed strategies. By offering all of its capacity at the price cap, 
a single seller can guarantee itself expected profit of, 
( ) ( )35 max
20
25 5 max 0, 45l
d l j
E d s
= ≠
⎡ ⎤⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤π = δ − − =⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ , 
where 1/16δ =  is the probability of each possible demand level for lsl. This expected profit is 
a lower bound for a firm’s mixed strategy equilibrium profit. This bound on profit permits us 
to bound a measure of expected equilibrium price. 
 Given the definition of ( )p d  in the main text, total expected equilibrium profit for the 
four firms in the market is defined by: 
( )( )35
20d
Total profit d p d c
=
= δ −∑
.
 
Since each firm must earn at least π  in equilibrium, we have the following inequality: 
( )( )35
20
4
d
Total profit d p d c
=
= δ − ≥ π∑
.
 
This implies that: 
 41
( )( ) [ ]35
20
4
d
d p d cE d
=
δ ≥ π+∑ , 
and this permits us to place a lower bound on the volume weighted average price: 
( )( )
[ ] [ ]
35
20
4 11.55
e
d
d p d
P c
E d E d=
δ π= ≥ + ≈∑  
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Appendix 3 – Equilibria of the SFE Model 
In the derivations for the SFE model we treat both price and quantity as continuous variables. 
 
Treatments hsh and hsl :   
There are no pivotal suppliers for these two treatments. Consider the profit for firm i 
in the event that demand is d, given that rival firm j chooses a differentiable supply function 
sj(p)  for j≠i. If the clearing price is p and firm i supplies the residual demand, ( )j
j i
d s p
≠
−∑ , 
then its profit is: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )( ),i j
j i
p d p c d s p
≠
⎛ ⎞π = − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
We seek a supply function si(p) for firm i that has the property that the clearing price 
p maximizes πi(p,d)  with ( ) ( )i j
j i
s p d s p
≠
= −∑ , for each possible ,d d d⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ . The necessary 
conditions for an (interior) optimal price for d for each firm i yield a system of ordinary 
differential equations for supply functions: 
  ( )' ( )
( )
i
j
j i
s ps p
p c≠
= −∑  
for i = 1,…,4. There is a continuum of symmetric solutions to this system of the form: 
(*) 
1
2
1
4( ) 'i
p cs p d
p c
⎛ ⎞−= ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠   
where 'p  is a price parameter that can take on any value in the interval, ( max, ; 'c p p⎤⎦    is the 
market clearing price associated with equilibrium supply strategies in (*) at maximum 
demand quantity, d . Figure 2 in the main text illustrates aggregate supply functions based on 
the strategies in (*). Note that in the limit as 'p  approaches c the supply strategy in (*) 
converges to the Bertrand strategy of offering all units at marginal cost. 
 
Treatments lsh and lsl :   
For these treatments any one of the sellers is pivotal for some or all demand quantities. When 
pivotal suppliers are present a strategy of offering capacity at prices close to marginal cost 
will not be a symmetric equilibrium strategy. If a seller’s rivals use strategies in (*) with  'p   
close to c then the seller would prefer to offer all of their capacity at the price cap rather than 
use strategy (*). Genc and Reynolds (2010) show that the symmetric supply function 
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strategies in (*) are equilibrium strategies for capacity constrained pivotal sellers for a 
restricted set of  'p  parameters. For treatment lsh the supply functions in (*) are equilibrium 
strategies for 'p ∈[21.7,25];; for treatment lsl the supply functions in (*) are equilibrium 
strategies for 'p ∈[17.7,25]. The equilibria associated with these price parameters are the 
basis for the (volume weighted) average equilibrium price predictions that we provide in 
Table 3 of the main text. 
 
Treatment hah : 
In this treatment there are two small sellers (each with 5 units of capacity) and two large 
sellers (each with 19 units of capacity). There are quasi-symmetric supply function equilibria 
of the following form. The small sellers each offer their capacity at a low price (e.g., at or 
near marginal cost). The two large sellers compete for the remaining residual demand (d – 
10) by choosing supply functions that are increasing in price. By using arguments similar to 
those used earlier in this Appendix one can show that there is a supply function equilibrium 
in which each  large seller i uses the linear strategy:  
(A3.4)  ( )12( ) 10 'i p cs p d p c⎛ ⎞−= − ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠  
where the price parameter satisfies, 'p ∈[11.9,25]. As in the other treatments there is a 
continuum of equilibria.  
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